Iran is a multiethnic state where non-Persian minorities comprise about half of the country's population of roughly 75 million (Hassan). The largest of these minorities are Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, and Balouch (Baloch), each of which is characterized by unique culture, political aspirations, and role in the Iranian society. Furthermore, each minority is faced with various challenges and grievances, factors which could turn them into potential US proxies against Iran's Islamic regime. This article looks at the prospects and drawbacks of US-Azeri coordination in Iran.
Azeris' Potential as a US Proxy
Azeri-Turks are by far the largest ethnic minority in Iran, numbering somewhere between 15 and 30 million according to various sources (Molavi). The most likely figure is closer to 20 million (Shaffer, 224). As such, they have the potential to become the biggest demographical threat to the current Iranian regime, capable of creating a major political upheaval in the country. Concentrated mainly in Iran’s northwestern provinces of East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Zanjan, and Ardabil, there is also a significant presence of Azeris in capital Tehran (Hassan).
Though not known for strong nationalist or separatist tendencies, Iranian Azeris have in the past attempted to politically distance themselves (though never separate) from the Iranian state. The most notable occurrence of this took place in 1946, when a group of leftist Azeri nationalists, driven by the abysmal economic conditions in Iran's Azeri populated region, formed with the support of Soviet troops an autonomous government there (Atabaki, 130).
Though short-lived (the region's autonomy was crushed by the central government only a year later), the autonomous movement illustrates that if effectively influenced, the Azeris in Iran could potentially become a reliable US proxy for destabilizing Iran. Despite being closely interwoven into the Iranian society, some Azeris claim discrimination by the Islamic regime, most notably the denial of their cultural rights. In 2006 thousands of Azeris protested against a cartoon published by a state-owned newspaper depicting them as cockroaches incapable of comprehending the Persian language spoken by the majority of Iranians (Collin).
Adding to the potency of their capabilities is the fact that Iran’s Azeri populated provinces are bordered by Republic of Azerbaijan on the north, with Azeris in two countries maintaining close ties. The government of Azerbaijani republic maintains an alliance with the US, and with the right incentives (increased US investment in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas industries), the latter could persuade the former into assuming a more proactive role in destabilizing Iran. Certain Pan-Turkist officials in Azerbaijan have been vocal about mobilizing Iran's Azeris, although the country's present leadership has trod cautiously on this issue.
Roadblocks: Azeris - The Well Integrated Minority
Though their large number in Iran makes Azeris an appealing proxy for the US to use against the Islamic regime, there are numerous challenges undermining that relationship. Because the vast majority of Iranian Azeris are well integrated into Iranian society and consider themselves to be Iranians first and Azeris second (Burke, 42-43), this particular minority may be the least receptive to America's efforts of destabilizing Iran (Ignatius).
Thus the US will have trouble tapping into the ethnic sentiments of the Azeris, which are significantly overriden by a strong sense of Iranian nationalism. It would be problematic convincing them to revolt against the state towards which they contributed as much as the majority Persians. In addition Azeris are adherents of Shi'a Islam, the state religion of Iran, a status which further reinforces their Iranian identity.
While the Azeri autonomous movement in 1946 suggests that Iranian Azeris may be influenced to revolt against the country's government, it more amply illustrates that they, like other Iranians, oppose becoming a proxy of an outside power. The autonomous movement is widely regarded as a Soviet proxy that sought to increase Soviet influence in Iran. As a result, the movement failed to garner support among local Azeris, who were wary of its affiliation with the USSR (Atabaki, 167).
Afshin Molavi, a Washington based expert on Iran states that, "The overwhelming majority of Iranian Azeris has displayed little interest in ethnic-inspired instability and virtually no interest in secession or unification with the Republic of Azerbaijan," and that, "Few people framed their genuine political, social and economic frustration, feelings that are shared by the majority of Iranians, within an ethnic context" (Molavi).
While many Iranian Azeris maintain cultural bonds with their brethren in the Republic of Azerbaijan, such ties rarely translate into aspirations for political unification of the two Azerbaijans. There is simply too little of an incentive for Azeris to destabilize or separate from a state in which they already exercise tremendous influence, with many of them occupying high level government positions (Ayatollah Khamenei, for example, is half Azeri). As one Iranian Azeri put it, “We already virtually control Iran. Why would we want to become Aliyev's slave?" (Molavi), referring to the Azerbaijani leadership which rivals the Iranian regime with its corruption and oppression.
Geopolitical Risks
Furthermore, by using the Republic of Azerbaijan as a base for the mobilization of Iranian Azeris, the US would be playing a very dangerous game of chess in an already unstable region. Such developments would most certainly worsen the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan by vindicating the former's accusations that Azerbaijan is an American satellite state, and providing the Islamic leadership with a strong incentive to destabilize its northern neighbor.
Such tensions could flare into a full blown armed conflict likely to pull in Azerbaijan’s close ally Turkey which will seek to protect its Turkic brethren as well as its energy investments in Azerbaijan against Iranian aggression. Such a scenario would prove disastrous for the region and should be avoided by the US at all costs. A stable Azeri-Iranian relationship may be inconvenient for America’s efforts to maximize its influence in the oil rich Caspian region, but it's vital for the stability of the region where stability is nowadays a rarity.
Sources
- Atabaki, T. (1993). Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Struggle for Power in Iran. New York: I.B. Taurus.
- Burke, A. (2004, November 1). Iran. Lonely Planet.
- Collin, M. (2006, May 28). Iran Azeris protest over cartoon. BBC News. Retrieved on August 8, 2011.
- Hassan, H. (2008, November 25). Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities. CRS Report for Congress. Retrieved August 9, 2011.
- Ignatius, D. (2008, July 3). Spy Games in Iran. The Washington Post. Retrieved August 11, 2011.
- Molavi, A. (2003, April 14). Iran's Azeri Question: What Does Iran’s Largest Ethnic Minority Want? Eurasianet.org. Retrieved on August 7, 2011.
- Shaffer, B. (2002). Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Enver Guseynov - I majored in International Affairs with emphasis on Middle East and have written several research papers and articles on the region.
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