The fate of Turkish Kurds has been underlined by continuous strife and suppression dating back to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne that made no provisions for the millions of Kurds that heavily populated southeastern Turkey (Gunter, 199). For the next eighty years, the unwillingness of Turkey's zealously nationalist military elite to grant Kurds recognition was reciprocated by an equally uncompromising Kurdish resistance. The conflict proved pivotal in the development of close Turkish-Israeli relations in the closing decades of the 20th century.
Rise of the PKK
PKK, short for Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers' Party, was founded in November of 1978 in a small village located in eastern Turkey. Despite the increasing cultural awareness and demands for cultural recognition among Turkish Kurds who represent 18% of the country's population (Thomas), a revised Turkish constitution in 1982 contained provisions that sought to limit even the speaking and writing of the Kurdish language (Gunter, 200). The continuation of Turkey’s uncompromising attitude towards its Kurdish population helped radicalize large segments of Turkish Kurds, thus allowing the PKK to quietly grow in numbers in its early years
Keeping a low profile throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the PKK began launching insurgency-style attacks against the Turkish government in 1984 while demanding political separation for Turkey’s Kurdish populated southeastern region. Thus for the first time in its history Turkey faced an enemy which directly and viably threatened the country’s territorial integrity. According to Sabri Sayari, “The challenge posed by the PKK to Turkey's political order and territorial integrity has become the single most important item on the country's domestic and foreign policy agendas” (Sayari, 47).
Between 1984 and 2000, the struggle between the Turkish government and the PKK “resulted in more than thirty-seven thousand deaths, the partial or complete destruction of as many as three thousand villages, and the internal displacement of some three million people” (Gunter, 200). During the same time period Turkish-Israeli relationship reached its apex.
Israel as Turkey's Ally Against the PKK
Turkey and Israel signed several military agreements between 1992 and 1999. During this time period Turkey's campaign against the Kurdish insurgency was at its peak, with the Turkish military publically stating that they considered the PKK to be the most significant threat to Turkish security (Murrinson, 102). Greatly contributing to Turkey’s increased reliance on Israel was the fact that Turkey was denied access to Western weapons due to concerns regarding their use against the country’s Kurdish population (Murinson, 106).
Such circumstances turned Israel into Turkey’s only reliable ally in its campaign against the PKK, as the Jewish state, determined to maintain close ties with its sole Muslim ally in the region, had less reservations about Turkey’s transgressions against the Kurds and readily sold it weapons (Larabee, 110). Conversely, it significantly contibuted to Turkey’s increasing tensions with Iran and Syria, both of which allegedly supported the PKK’s campaign against Turkey.
Turkey was particularly wary of Syria’s close affiliation with the PKK, with Sayari arguing that “The PKK threat has exacted a heavy toll on Syrian-Turkish relations, which had been strained for most of the Cold War period…Ankara views Damascus as the PKK's principal source of external logistical support and training” (47).
Turkey's tensions with Syria conformed to Israel's own stance towards the Arab state, which by the end of the Cold War emerged as the Jewish state's chief Arab adversary. Thus by being a sponsor of the PKK, Syria provided an imperative raison d'être for the Israeli-Turkish alliance in the 1990s.
Israel's Gains from the Turkey-PKK Conflict
A major military agreement, dubbed “Defense Industry Cooperation”, was signed between Turkey and Israel in 1996. Among other things, it included large scale military sales and coproduction of military equipment, including configuration of Turkish jet fighters with sophisticated Israeli technology. Most notably it allowed Israel to station fighter planes at Turkish airbases close to Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian borders (Murinson, 47), thus providing Israel with a strategic edge over its regional rivals.
Kurdish plight and insurgency in Turkey proved beneficial for Israel, as it isolated Turkey both from its NATO allies and exacerbated tensions with its regional neighbors, thus increasing its dependance on the Jewish state. Turkey’s isolation and reliance on Israel in the 1990s ideally conformed to the latter's periphery doctrine, which emphasized close relations with the region's non-Arab states. While Israel never wanted PKK to overwhelm Turkey, it also didn't want to see Turkey's Kurdish issue resolved, since this would have reduced its dependence on Israel, thus increasing the latter's isolation in the region.
Sources
- Gunter, M. (2004, Spring). The Kurdish Question in Perspective. World Affairs, 166(4), 197-205.
- Larrabee, S. (2007, July-August). Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East. Foreign Affairs, 86(4), 103-114.
- Murinson, Al. (2010). Turkey’s Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State Identity and Security in the Middle East and Caucasus. Routledge: New York.
- Sayari, S (1997, Spring). Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s. Journal of Palestine Studies, 26(3), 44-55.
- Thomas, L. (2011, April 21). Kurds Renew Their Movement for Rights and Respect in Turkey. The New York Times.
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