The Aras River that flows through the Republic of Azerbaijan is more than a body of water. In the earlier half of the 19th century the river became a superimposed boundary between Russian and Persian empires. Per stipulations of the 1813 Treaty of Gullistan and 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay, Persia was forced to concede its Caucasian territorial possessions to Russia (Shaffer, 22).The southeastern segment of the Caucasus lost to Russia was inhabited by a Turkic people that also occupied the northwestern region of the Persian Empire called Azerbaijan. Thus the Aras River that became the border between Russia and Persia, also divided ethnically homogenous group of people living south and north of it.
Azeris: A Divided People
Throughout the next 170 years, the Turks south of the Aras remained part of Persian Empire, later Iran, becoming a well integrated minority within the country’s socio-political sphere. Under Russia’s tsarist regime, the distinctive status of Caucasian Turks as Muslims prevented them becoming culturally assimilated within the Russian Empire, in the process helping foster a unique identity among them. As the result of these political divisions Iranian and Caucasian Azeris have today evolved into two distinct groups of people; united by a common ethnicity, yet divided by their political and national affiliations.
The region now known as the Republic of Azerbaijan didn’t acquire that name until 1917, following the fall of the Russian Empire. The Iranian province of Azerbaijan was the namesake for the Azerbaijani Republic. The leaders of short-lived Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus were quick to distance themselves from any irredentist claims to Iranian Azerbaijan for fear of creating tensions with the Iranian government (Atabaki, 25). After the young republic was absorbed by the USSR in 1920, becoming Azerbaijan SSR, it wouldn’t be until 1991, when the Republic of Azerbaijan gained its independence from Soviet Union that the issue of Iranian Azerbaijan once again resurfaced between Iran and the Azerbaijani Republic.
As a result of Moscow’s restrictions on religious practices during the Soviet era, the Azeris of Soviet Azerbaijan and later the Azerbaijani Republic have been more secular than their Iranian co-ethnics, whose stronger commitment to the Muslim faith was engendered by the strong presence of Shi’a Ulama (Islamic scholars) in Iran, as well as the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Although both Iranian and Caucasian Azeris belong to the Shi’a branch of Islam, the secularism of Azerbaijanis and religiousness of Iranians became the key elements dividing the Azeris living on the opposite sides of the Aras River. In addition the primary identification of most Iranian Azeris as Iranian rather than Azeri, as witnessed in the high level of integration of Azeris into Iranian society, has reinforced the differences with the Azeris in northern Azerbaijan
Geopolitical Tensions
Following its independence from Moscow in 1991, the Republic of Azerbaijan’s leaders, having adopted a strong nationalist platform began talking about the ties between Caucasian and Iranian Azeris. Azerbaijan’s irredentist claims to Iran’s Turkic populated northwestern region became a popular topic among many Azeri politicians. Most notably Abulfaz Elchibey, the nation’s first president, known for his strong nationalist and anti-Iranian views, began to openly discuss the question of a united Azerbaijan and was repeatedly accusing Iran’s Islamic government for its alleged suppression of Iran’s Azeri minority (Cornell, 2004).
However while Elchibey was voicing his nationalistic sentiments regarding Iranian Azerbaijan and threatening the territorial integrity of Iran, Republic of Azerbaijan itself was in the midst of a bitter conflict with the neighboring Armenia. The conflict erupted in late 1980s over Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed region in western Azerbaijan with a majority Armenian population (Cornell, 1997). By 1990s the conflict turned into a fully fledged war, as Azeri and Armenian forces engaged one another in Nagorno-Karabakh and its vicinity.
The conflict was frozen, but by no means resolved in 1994, with Nagorno-Karabakh, and several surrounding regions falling under Armenian occupation (Cornell, 1997). Thus throughout the 1990s, the Nagorno-Karabakh completely overshadowed the issue of Iranian Azerbaijan, as the republic’s Azeris were more concerned about restoring their own territorial integrity, than threatening that of another state. The events of Karabakh were much fresher in the memories of Azeris than the 170- year-old signing of Turkmenchai Treaty, the nature of which was trivial to many.
United Azerbaijan Highly Unlikely
In order for unification between two ethnically homogenous, territorially contiguous, politically divided regions to occur, the ambitions and beliefs of the populations and/or governments of both political units have to be synchronized into a common goal. When it came to the question of Azerbaijan’s unification, the Azeri Republic’s leadership played its part by hinting towards a reunification of northern and southern Azerbaijan. However, the Azeri Republic’s irredentist claims were not reciprocated by a secessionist movement in Iranian Azerbaijan.
Even though some welcomed a restoration of cultural ties with their co-ethnics north of the Aras River, the vast majority of Iranian Azeris has been opposed to a unification of the two regions (Shaffer, 168). North of the border, Caucasian Azeris’ nationalist sentiments have always been oriented towards the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, largely marginalizing the issue of Iranian Azerbaijan within the Azeri Republic.
This helps explain Iran’s tacit support of Armenia during the conflict; as long as the dispute remains Azerbaijan’s primary political issue, the irredentist claims to Iranian Azerbaijan will remain relatively dormant. Iran has capitalized on the Azerbaijani Republic’s own geopolitical weakness to counter the irredentist claims its leadership had towards its Turkic populated northwestern provinces. The Republic of Azerbaijan simply couldn’t maintain such claims and attempt to incite a secessionist movement in Iran, while facing one within its own territory.
Sources
- Atabaki, T. (1993). Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Struggle for Power in Iran. New York: I.B. Taurus
- Cornell, S. (1997, Fall). Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 20 (4).
- Cornell, S. (2004, November) Iranian Azerbaijan: A Brewing Hotspot. Presentation to Symposium on “Human Rights and Ethnicity in Iran”, November 22, 2004, organized by the Moderate (conservative) party, Swedish Parliament, Stockholm.
- Shaffer, B. (2002). Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. .
Enver Guseynov - I majored in International Affairs with emphasis on Middle East and have written several research papers and articles on the region.
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