The previous article of this three part series analyzed oil politics as one of the bases for the US-Azeri alliance in the Caspian region. Another indicator of Azerbaijan’s transformation into an American proxy has been an increased military cooperation between the two states in the 2000s. Previously American aid to Azerbaijan has been restricted by Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act which sought to reprimand Azerbaijan for its blockade of Armenia following the latter's occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Military cooperation between the two states was virtually non-existent due to those restrictions. Then the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred, an event that propelled US-Azeri relations to new heights.
Bringing Azerbaijan on Board America's War on Terror
Following 9/11 the US began reaching out to several Central Asian states in an effort to bring them on board its fight against global terrorism. Along with building a close relationship with Azerbaijan, it also created alliances with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, establishing air bases in both states. What has made Azerbaijan unique in its role as America’s partner is its strategic position vis-à-vis Iran, suggesting that global terrorism isn’t the only target of the Azeri-US alliance.
Out of all the central Asian and Caucasian states, Azerbaijan has had the most problematic relationship with Iran since its independence, making it particularly receptive to America’s anti-Iranian policies in the region. For the US strengthening Azerbaijan was yet another means of containing Iran, already surrounded by American military presence in several states bordering it.
Strengthening Azerbaijan as a Means of Containing Iran
As a testament to America’s commitment towards strengthening Azerbaijan, George Bush waived Section 907 in 2002, alleviating restrictions on American aid to Azerbaijan. The waiver has been extended in subsequent years by the Bush and Obama administrations. It has allowed the US to increase the size of its aid packages to Azerbaijan and perhaps more importantly, allowed the two states to enhance military ties (Ismailova).
Increased US aid has gone hand-in-hand with supporting Azerbaijan’s claims to disputed Caspian oil fields. While its military expansion efforts are mainly aimed at neighboring Armenia, whose forces have been occupying Azerbaijan's region of Nagorno-Karabakh since 1993, it also puts Azerbaijan in a stronger position to counter any challenges from Iran, thus conforming to US policy of reducing Iranian influence in the region.
Indeed, it can be argued that one of the purposes of the Section 907 waiver has been the containment of Iran. It’s no coincidence that the waiver’s official release and President Bush’s "Axis of Evil" speech occurred within a two-day span.
Even before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US government, undeterred by the restrictions of Section 907, was making efforts to strengthen Azerbaijan. In March 2001 the United States pledged $4.4 million in military aid to the country. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mira Ricardel said the purpose of the aid was "to counter threats such as terrorism, to promote peace and stability in the Caucasus, and to develop trade and transport corridors" (Begoyan, 152). There is little doubt however that another purpose of that aid was strengthening Azerbaijan to diminish challenges from Iran (Peimani, 580).
Implications of US-Azeri Partnership Against Iran: Increasing Insecurity in the Caspian
While the US has been effectively capitalizing on Azerbaijan’s craving for growth and wealth to enhance its efforts of containing and isolating Iran, it has contributed to a tense atmosphere in southern Caspian that could jeopardize the very interests that it’s trying to promote. Azerbaijan’s transformation into America’s proxy carries with it some risks.
Emboldened by US backing, Azerbaijan has been exploring some of the disputed oil fields that are also claimed by Iran. Since Iran has refused to recognize the median line division of the Caspian, it has accused Azerbaijan of illegal developments in the fields to which Iran also has ownership claims (Peimani, 578). Iran has also accused Azerbaijan of violating its territorial waters, and in a summer 2001 incident, an Iranian navy vessel forced an Azeri BP ship to leave the disputed Alov field claimed by both states (Iran is Accused...).
American backing hardens Azerbaijan’s position on the division of the Caspian, giving it lesser incentive to reach a bilateral agreement with Iran since such agreement would likely result in Azerbaijan losing rights to some of the disputed fields claimed by it. Furthermore, the obvious American backing of Azerbaijan might make it thornier for Iran to reach compromises with the latter on the reservoirs' division, since such agreements would translate into Iran giving concessions to the US.
Iran is less likely to cooperate with Azerbaijan if it sees it as a vessel carrying American ambitions of containing it. The Islamic state could counter Azerbaijan’s American backed military buildup and policies in the Caspian by bolstering the naval presence in its section of the Caspian, thus setting off an arms race between the two states. This increases the possibility of an armed confrontation between Azerbaijan and Iran over disputed oil fields, an event that could drive away Western oil companies from the southern Caspian, threaten pipelines like Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa that are critical for exporting Azerbaijan’s oil into Western markets, and create chaos throughout the entire Caspian region.
Sources
- Begoyan, A. (2004). United States Policy in the South Caucasus: Securitisation of the Baku: Ceyhan Project. Iran & the Caucasus, 8(1), 141-155.
- Iran Is Accused of Threatening Research Vessel in Caspian Sea. (2001, July 25). The New York Times.
- Ismailova, G. (2002, October 4). Azerbaijan-American Military Consultations Take Place in Baku. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst.
- Peimani, H. (2003). Growing Tension and the Threat of War in the Southern Caspian Sea: The Unsettled Division Dispute and Regional Rivalry. Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 2(3,4), 575-591.
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